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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Since these two provisions are the most indefinite of the five
included in the statute, and because of their novelty, it is im-
possible to determine at this time what scope will be given to
them. The other three provisions will cover most of the cases
requiring jurisdiction over nonresidents. It is with these situa-
tions - causes of action arising from contracts, and causes of
action arising from in-state and out-of-state tort - that the two
comments following are concerned.
David E. Soileau
JURISDICTION IN PERSONAM OVER CONTRACTS
WITH NONRESIDENTS
INTRODUCTION
The Louisiana State Law Institute, in drafting Louisiana's
"long-arm" statute, included three subsections which will affect
the in personam jurisdiction of Louisiana courts over causes of
action arising from contracts entered into by nonresidents. These
subsections relate to: the transacting of any business in this
state; contracting to supply services and things in this state;
and having an interest in, using, or possessing a real right or
immovable property in this state.' A subsection pertaining to
contracts of insurance was not included in the Louisiana statute
because the Louisiana Insurance Code 2 gives adequate coverage.3
Both nonresident individuals and non-licensed foreign corpora-
tions are included in the coverage of the statute.4 Nonresident
individuals have been held subject to local jurisdiction on the
same basis as corporations by state courts and lower federal
courts, and the position has been approved by the American Law
Institute.5
1. Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresidents Statute, LA. R.S. 13:3201(a) (b) (e)
(Supp. 1964).
2. LA. R.S. 22:1-1734 (1950).
3. See notes 74-77 infra, and accompanying text.
4. Those corporations which have licenses to do business in the state are
not covered by this "long-arm" statute because, being licensed, they are subject
to the jurisdiction of Louisiana courts. See Comment (b) under LA. R.S. 13:3206
(Supp. 1964).
5. See Towe, Personal Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents and Montana's New
Rule 4B, 24 MONT. L. REV. 3, 9 (1962). The definition of nonresident given
in LA. R.S. 13:3206 (Supp. 1964) includes individuals, partnerships, associa-
tions, and corporations not licensed to do business in Louisiana.
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The purpose of this Comment is to point out how other states
have implemented their "long-arm" statutes with respect to con-
tracts. The constitutionality and applicability of the Louisiana
statute will be governed primarily by what has occurred in other
states. In addition, it may be possible to ascertain prospectively
the effect of Louisiana's statute on Louisiana citizens. There
will be, of course, advantages and disadvantages which will be-
come evident only in the future, but many of the positive and
negative aspects of the statute can be found by examining the
cumulative effect of decisions involving the several long-arm
statutes enacted over the past decade.
TRANSACTING ANY BUSINESS IN THIS STATE
Nearly all of the states which have enacted "long-arm"
statutes have made "the transaction of any business" one of the
bases for jurisdiction in personam. This basis has been held con-
stitutional in several of those states which include it in their
act., The decisions handed down in the last few years clearly
indicate that the transaction of any business in the state is an
adequate basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction by the
state, at least as to causes of action connected with that business.
The Illinois statute,7 which has been used frequently as a model
act by other state legislatures, has been construed to be an at-
tempt to make the "transaction of any business" coextensive in
scope with the constitutional bounds of due process." It appears
settled, after the McGee decision,9 that a single business trans-
action may be the basis for assertion of jurisdiction in personam
over a nonresident defendant. In McGee, the Supreme Court
upheld the jurisdiction of California over a nonresident insur-
ance company after service was made by registered mail at the
defendant's Texas office, in a claim involving a single life insur-
6. See, e.g., Berlemann v. Superior Distrib. Co., 7 11. App. 2d 522, 151 N.E.2d
116 (1958) ; Totero v. World Telegram Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 594, 245 N.Y.S.2d
870 (1963).
7. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1956). This statute has been upheld many
times 'by both state and federal courts. See, e.g., Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378,
143 N.E.2d 673 (1957). Also, much has been written about the Illinois statute.
See, e.g., Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Bight Years of Extended Jurisdic-
tion in Illinois, 1963 I. ILL. L.F. 533 (1963) ; Comment, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 79
(1958).
8. Green v. Bluff Creek Oil Co., 287- F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1961). In Nelson v.
Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 389, 143 N.E.2d 673, 679 (1957), the court said the Illinois
long-arm statute reflects a conscious purpose to assert jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent defendants to the extent permitted by the due process clause.
9. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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ance policy with a California resident. Service was based on a
California law which subjected nonresident corporations to suit
in California on insurance contracts with California residents.
The mailing of a policy to plaintiff in California was the de-
fendant company's only contact with that state. In addition, the
premiums were mailed by plaintiff from California. The Court
held that the suit in California did not "offend the traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice,"' and that Cali-
fornia had a manifest interest in providing for redress against
insurers refusing to pay valid claims." Thus, the International
Shoe requirement of "minimum contacts" 12 may be satisfied by
a single, isolated business transaction." However, a difficult
problem for the courts is what amount and kind of activity will
constitute minimum contacts and not "offend the traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice."'1 4 Prior to the enact-
ment of a long-arm statute, many courts had rendered decisions
holding that mere solicitation and negotiation by a nonresident
in the state was not sufficient contact on which to base jurisdic-
tion.15 After passage of long-arm statutes,1 6 courts felt able to
hold otherwise. 17 Today it is correct to say that the amount and
10. Id. at 222, quoting from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945).
11. 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
12. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
13. This, of course, does not mean all single business transactions are suffi-
cient. However, the transaction must be "business" according to the decision
of Koplin v. Saul Lerner Co., 52 111. App. 2d 97, 201 N.E.2d 763 (1964). There
the court said the fact that the nonresident defendants registered with the Illinois
Secretary of State did not bring them within Illinois' long-arm jurisdiction,
because there was no showing of any business transaction. See generally Ganz,
"Doing Business" in Illinois as a Basis of a Jurisdiction over Nonresidents-Due
Process and Contacts, 1 ILL. CONTINUING lfEGAL ED. 75 (1963), for an excellent
discussion of jurisdiction over single business transactions, especially in regard
to the Illinois statute.
14. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). This
standard for due process was reiterated by the Court in McGee and is now the
criterion for decisions involving jurisdiction in personam over nonresidents.
15. See, e.g., G. W. Bull & Co. v. Boston & Me. R.R., 344 Ill. 11, 175 N.E.
837 (1931). The state courts were simply following the rule pronounced in
Green v. Chicago, B & Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1907) that "mere solicita-
tion" of orders to be accepted and filled from outside the state was not "doing
business" for due process purposes.
16. These state statutes were enacted in response to the Supreme Court deci-
sions of International Shoe and McGee and were in effect codifications of the
standards set down in these landmark cases.
17. See, e.g., Berlemann v. Superior Distrib. Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 522, 151
N.E. 2d 116 (1958), which illustrates the change brought about by the new,
far-reaching statutes. There, in an action by a buyer for breach of warranty,
the court held that the Illinois statute was applicable because the defendant
had transacted business in Illinois. Defendant had, through an agent in Illinois,
solicited two orders from the plaintiff and had also agreed to send an employee
to train the plaintiff in the operation of the machines ordered, The machines
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kind of activities which must be carried on by a nonresident in
the forum state, to make it just and reasonable to subject him to
jurisdiction in personam, must be determined according to the
facts of each case. i1 For the most part, it is the "kind" of ac-
tivity, or the nature or quality of the act or business, which
controls the jurisdictional question, not the quantity of business
carried on by the nonresident. 9
The phrase "transaction of any business in the state" appears
quite similar in meaning to "doing business." 20 However, the
proved defective; plaintiff sued in an Illinois court and personal service was
made on defendant in Colorado. There had been the transaction of some busi-
ness in Illinois, and the cause of action arose out of defendant's activities in
the forum state. Accord, National Gas Appliance Corp. v. AB Electrolux, 270
F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1959) ; Wisconsin Metal & Chemical Corp. v. DeZurik Corp.,
222 F. Supp. 119 (E.D. Wis. 1963) ; Kropp Forge Co. v. Jawitz, 37 Ill. App.
2d 475, 186 N.E.2d 76 (1962) ; S. Hawes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 665
(Okla. 1954). But see Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts, 270 F.2d 821 (7th Cir.
1959) ; Kaye-Martin v. Brooks, 267 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1959) ; Orton v. Woods
Oil & Gas 'o., 249 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1957) ; Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta
Co., 229 F. Supp. 98 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) ; Grobark v. Addo Machine Co., 16 Ill. 2d
426, 158 N.E.2d 73 (1959) ; Irgang v. Pelton & Crane Co., 42 Misc. 2d 70, 247
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1964); Jump v. Duplex Vending Corp., 44 Misc. 2d 950, 246
N.Y.S.2d 864 (1964).
18. See, e.g., State v. Knapp, 131 S.E.2d 81, 90 (W.Va. 1963). In Schroeder
v. Loomis, 46 Misc. 2d 184, 186, 259 N.Y.S.2d 42, 46 (1965), the court said:
"Whether the type of activity conducted within the State is adequate to satisfy
the requirement depends upon the facts in the particular case. The question can-
not be answered by applying a mechanical formula or rule of thumb but by ascer-
taining what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances. In the application
of this flexible test the relevant inquiry is whether defendant engaged in some
act or conduct by which he may be said to have invoked the benefits and pro-
tections of the law of the forum."
19. In Kropp Forge Co. v. Jawitz, 37 Ill. App. 2d 475, 186 N.E.2d 76 (1962),
which involved a single business transaction without continuing obligations, the
test was held to be the "substance" of the act, not the quantity. In International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945), the Court stressed that the
criteria "cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative . W.. hether due process
is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in
relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the
purpose of the due process clause to insure." This does not mean that quantity
is not considered, but only that it is not the controlling factor.
20. In Rock-Ola Mfg. Corp. v. Wertz, 249 F.2d 813 (4th Cir. 1957), the court
construed the term "transacting business" to mean "doing business." Contra,
Steele v. DeLeeuw, 40 Misc. 2d 807, 244 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1963) ; cf. Developments
i, the law - State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 1002 (1960). In
this exhaustive symposium, in discussing the change in the "doing business" stat-
utes, it was stated that "the effect of such a change varies from state to state,
but generally a departure from the traditional 'doing business' language in this
manner will lead state courts to accept a lesser degree of activity than was
formerly required." See LA. R.S. 13:3201, Comment (d) (Supp. 1964) : " 'Trans-
acting business,' as used in Subdivision (a), is a term which is much broader
than 'doing business' as defined by earlier Louisiana cases, and the phrase 'does
. . . business' of Subdivision (d) conferring personal jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent on a cause of action arising ex delicto or quasi ex delicto. It is intended
to mean a single transaction of either interstate or intrastate business, and to be
as broad as the phrase 'engaged in a business activity' of R.S. 13:3471(1)."
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two phrases are not necessarily synonymous, since "doing busi-
ness" as used in older statutes means a continuous course of
business within the state.21 Under those statutes, a single con-
tract or mere solicitation would not be a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction in personam. 22 Thus, it would seem that "the trans-
action of any business" is meant to be broader in scope than
"doing business." 23
A consideration in determining sufficient contacts for pur-
poses of jurisdiction is the amount of regulation which the state
has placed on residents engaged in the same business. 24 Another
factor given considerable weight is the place where the con-
tractual relationship was made binding.25 This is particularly
21. In Haas v. Fancher Furniture Co., 156 F. Supp. 564, 567 (N.D. Ill.
1957), involving an action for breach of an employment contract, the court de-
clared that the "transaction of any business within the state" should not be
given the restrictive interpretation that was given "doing business." See e.g.,
Taylor Laundry Co. v. District Court, 102 Mont. 274, 279, 57 P.2d 772, 775
(1936). Cf. Worley Beverages, Inc. v. Bubble Up Corp., 167 F. Supp. 498, 504
(E.D.N.C. 1958), where it was held that "doing business" as used in the North
Carolina statute means exercising in North Carolina some of the functions for
which the corporation was created. The nonresident corporation was held sub-
ject to North Carolina's jurisdiction because it was promoting its soft drink
concentrate and assisting its distributors in sales of the bottled drink. The court
also stated that "it is generally considered that changing the statute from 'doing
business' to 'transacting business' only had the effect of liberalizing the statute."
Id. at 504.
22. But see Huck v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 4 Wis. 2d 132, 90 N.W.2d
154 (1958), where under an old statute, the court held solicitation to be "doing
business." It appears that the Wisconsin court adopted the expanded concept of
"doing business" for the purpose of jurisdiction before the revised long-arm statute
became effective, particularly since the court said it was immaterial to its deci-
sion whether the defendant corporation extended its activities beyond mere solici-
tation.
23. Developments in the Law - State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. RM.
909, 1002 (1960). LA. R.S. 13:3201(a) (Supp. 1964) requires some activity
within the state. Subsections (b) and (d) do not. Subsection (c) does require
activity within the state, but not necessarily transaction of business.
24. Generally, if the business is of a nature that is subject to considerable
state regulation, the nonresident will be held subject to the in personam juris-
diction of the state. The best example is the insurance business. Also, danger-
ous businesses usually fall in this category.
25. See, e.g., Compania de Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237,
107 A.2d 357 (1954), where Maryland jurisdiction over a Panamanian company
was upheld on the basis of a contract with a Maryland resident negotiated by
mail. The contract for the sale of three ships was to be completed on the foreign
purchaser's inspection and approval of the ships. Thus, the contract was deemed
"made" in Maryland. In connection with this, see Comment, 38 WASH. L. REv.
560, 565 (1963). Compare McMenomy v. Wonder Bldg. Corp. of America, 188
F. Supp. 213 (D. Minn. 1960). where Minnesota was held to have jurisdiction,
although the contract was completed in Illinois. Many states have been denied
jurisdiction in personam because the contract was not "made" in the state.
See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Andrew Weir Ins. Co., 154 F. Supp. 6 (D. Md. 1957),
in which plaintiff's offer to render services had been accepted and the contract
made outside of the United States; and Chesapeake Supply & Equip. Co. v. Mani-
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important, since it is often difficult to ascertain where and when
the breach occurred, thus making time and place of breach im-
practical as controlling factors.26 In contrast, the place and time
of commission of a tortious act is more readily determined, and
therefore is often controlling.2 7
Because it has been in effect only two years, the New York
long-arm statute28 and cases construing it should be of interest
to Louisiana, primarily because New York had ample oppor-
tunity to observe the effects of construction given the pioneer
long-arm statutes, and could, therefore, profit by the experience
of other states. Hopefully, Louisiana courts will find their posi-
tion even more advantageous. The New York statute has the
broad "transacting any business" subsection, and there have al-
ready been many cases under that provision. Jurisdiction was
upheld where a majority stockholder of a Netherlands corpora-
tion entered into a contract to purchase stock on behalf of the
corporation.28 In another case there were extensive negotiations,
followed by execution of a supplemental contract, and installa-
tion by the defendant corporation in New York. Here the court
found sufficient contact to support New York jurisdiction.80
That the initial contract was made in Illinois and the goods
delivered f.o.b. Illinois was not controlling. Jurisdiction was not
upheld in a case where the only contact was solicitation by the
traveling salesmen of a foreign corporation and insertion of the
towoc Eng'r Corp., 232 Md. 555, 194 A.2d 624 (1963), where defendant had a
distributorship agreement with a local firm which also distributed for other
manufacturers, but which had no authority to bind the defendant. All contracts
were accepted, and therefore made, in Wisconsin. But of. Babineaux v. South-
eastern Drilling Corp., 170 So. 2d 518 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965), which concerned
a "business activity" by a Panamanian corporation sufficient to confer jurisdic-
tion on Louisiana courts, under LA. R.S. 13:3471(1) (1950).
26. Patrick Ellam, Inc. v. Nieves, 41 Misc. 2d 186, 245 N.Y.S.2d 545 (1963),
where the contract was made in New York, the breach occurred in the Atlantic
Ocean, and the court held the making of the contract in New York was suffi-
cient contact.
27. See Developments in the Law - State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HA~v. L. REV.
909, 1003-04 (1960).
28. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & RULES § 302 (1963). The subsection on transaction
of any business was held constitutional in Totero v. World Telegram Corp.,
41 Misc. 2d 594, 245 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1963), wherein a writer's articles, distributed
by a syndicate to New York, were held to be a business transaction within the
state.
29. Steele v. DeLeeuw, 40 Misc. 2d 807, 244 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1963). The court
explained that the term "transacts any business" does not mean "doing business"
as that term has been traditionally understood in New York. The court also
held that the 1963 statute was controlling although the cause of action com-
menced prior to the effective date of the statute.
30. Longines-Wittnauer Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 21 A.D.2d 474, 251
N.Y.S.2d 740 (1964).
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foreign corporation's name in the New York City phone book. 81
Jurisdiction was also denied where the foreign corporation had
no offices, telephone listing, or agents in New York, but sold
$200,000 worth of washing machines to a New York resident ;32
the orders for the machines were accepted and filled out of state,
and shipment on sight draft was made to a New York ware-
house. From these cases it is apparent that there is no mechani-
cal test in New York courts to determine what constitutes a
transaction of business.3 3 Like most states, New York decides
the cases on the facts and circumstances, with reasonableness
and due process as the guides.
The major argument against allowance of jurisdiction in
personam on the basis of the transaction of any business is that
it would be a denial of due process. Over the years there have
been several tests devised to decide the due process question.
8 4
These tests are all essentially the same as the "minimum con-
tacts" test of International Shoe, elaborated on by McGee,85 and
modified by Hanson v. Denckla.3 6 The latter case involved the
attempted assertion of jurisdiction by the Florida courts over a
Delaware trustee. The validity of the trust agreement was at
issue, and the Court held that even though the settlor and most
of the beneficiaries were domiciled in Florida, the Florida courts
31. Irgang v. Pelton & Crane Co., 42 Misc. 2d 70, 247 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1964).
The court in this case apparently did not desire to go to the outer edges of con-
stitutional limitations by stretching judicially the legislative intent. See also
National Gas Appliance Corp. v. AB Electrolux, 270 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1959)
Grobark v. Addo Machine Co., 16 111. 2d 426, 158 N.E.2d 73 (1959).
32. Jump v. Duplex Vending Corp., 44 Misc. 2d 950, 246 N.Y.S.2d 864 (1964)
cf. Perlmutter v. Standard Roofing & Tinsmith Supply Co., 43 Misc. 2d 885, 252
N.Y.S.2d 583 (1964), where personal jurisdiction was denied although the de-
fendant had sent bills into the state and conducted limited negotiations regarding
complaints about alleged defective materials. Contra, Donley v. Whirlpool Corp.,
234 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Mich. 1964), where the court seemed to base its decision
on the fact that the defendant made $270,000 in sales in Michigan, which con-
stituted six per cent of defendant's total sales.
33. A discussion of the policy behind the New York long-arm statute, and
some pertinent questions which should be asked when a court is considering
whether the state should have jurisdiction in personam are found in Home Crafts
Inc. v. Gramercy Homes, Inc., 41 Misc. 2d 591, 246 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1964). For
a recent federal court decision which lists several factors to be considered in
determining whether sufficient business transactions based on sales exist, see
Velandra v. Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1964).
34. See, e.g., the factors listed in Hearne v. Dow-Badische Co., 224 F. Supp.
90, 99 (S.D. Texas 1963) and Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Co., 62 Wash.
2d 106, 115, 381 P.2d 245, 251 (1963).
35. See notes 9-13 supra, and accompanying text.
36. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1957). The tests of these three cases,
McGee, International Shoe, and Hanson, are given in the form of three rules in
L.D. Reeder Contractors v, Higgins Indus., Inc., 265 F.2d 768, 773 (9th Cir.
1959).
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could not exercise jurisdiction over the nonresident trustee be-
cause the nonresident trustee did not have sufficient minimum
contacts with Florida. Since the trustee was an indispensable
party, the Florida courts could not adjudicate validity of the
trust.
Probably the best discussion of the results of the "minimum
contacts" test was given by Justice Traynor of the California
Supreme Court in a much cited decision.3 7 The decision is of
considerable value today, particularly since it was written sub-
sequent to the above-mentioned Supreme Court decisions. Jus-
tice Traynor pointed out that regular sales solicitation alone
can render a foreign corporation amenable to process in actions
connected with such activities.38 Also, there is no distinction,
for jurisdictional purposes, between regular selling and regular
buying.89 In some circumstances there can be adequate basis
for jurisdiction where defendant has dealt with plaintiff only
by mail,40 or where the cause of action arose out of breach of a
contract made and to be performed in the state,41 or even out
of a mere isolated act in the state by defendant or his agent.4
CONTRACTING To SUPPLY SERVICES OR THINGS IN THIS STATE
This subsection is not found in several long-arm statutes
because "transaction of any business" has been considered to
include contracts for supplying goods and services.43 However,
37. Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d
437 (1958). This case indicates that a court can reconstrue traditional "doing
business" statutes to be coextensive with the limits of due process in the light
of International Shoe, without any change in the jurisdictional "doing business"
statutes.
38. Id. at 859, 323 P.2d at 440; accord, Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia,
339 U.S. 643, 64849 (1950) ; Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 426 (1946).
39. Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d
437 (1958) ; accord, Star Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Red Ash Pocahontas Coal Co., 102
F. Supp. 258, 259 (E.D. Ky. 1951) ; Sterling Novelty Corp. v. Frank & Hirsch
Distrib. Co., 299 N.Y. 208, 210, 86 N.E.2d 564 (1949).
40. Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 860, 323 P.2d
437, 440-41 (1958) ; accord, McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957) ; Parmalee v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 206 F.2d 518, 522 (5th
Cir. 1953).
41. Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 860-61, 323 P.2d
437, 441 (1958) ; accord, Compania De Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205
Md. 237, 108 A.2d 372 (1958).
42. Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 861, 323 P.2d
437, 441 (1958) ; accord, Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) ; Johns v. Bay
State Abrasive Prod. Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950).
43. Of the fifteen states upon whose statutes the Uniform Interstate and
International Procedure Act was based, only seven have a provision comparable
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the "transacting any business" subsection should not include the
"contracting" subsection 44 because the latter would give juris-
diction in personam in an action based on a wholly executory
contract and on an action against foreign manufacturers or sup-
pliers for defects in things supplied, whereas the "transacting
any business" subsection would not.45 Moreover, the transacting
business subsection requires some activity in the state, while the
contracting subsection does not. Thus, taken together, the two
subsections wold have as broad a coverage as is permissible over
economic activity that has some connection with the state.46
Several state statutes require that the contract be performed
"in whole or in part" in the state in order for the state to assume
jurisdiction.4 7 The courts in these states must first define what
is performance in part in order to determine whether the statute
is applicable. The next issue is whether the application of the
statute offends due process. In effect, the courts in such a situa-
tion are examining the part performance to see if the require-
ment of sufficient contacts by the nonresident defendant has
been satisfied. In a 1965 case involving the Minnesota "per-
formance in part" statute, where the nonresident seller agreed
to supply the buyer with seller's product, the contract was held
to be sufficient contact. 48 The court stated that the statute re-
quired only that a portion of the contract be performed by either
of the parties in the state. Therefore, it was irrelevant whether
delivery of the goods be considered part of plaintiff's, or de-
fendant's, performance under the contract.49 Regardless of how
to LA. R.S. 13:3201(b) (Supp. 1964). Three of these seven, Michigan, Montana,
and Maryland, have provisions extremely similar to 13:3201 (b).
44. See note 23 supra.
45. See Comment, Jurisdiction by Statute, 24 OHIo ST. L.J. 223, 227 (1963).
This comment includes a good discussion of the scope of the provisions of the
Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, from which the Louisiana
statute was adapted.
46. Id. at 227.
47. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.13(1) (3) (Supp. 1964). This part of
the statute was upheld as constitutional in Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99
N.W.2d 670 (1959).
48. Kornfeuhrer v. Philadelphia Bindery, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 157 (D. Minn.
1965).
49. Id. at 159. The court noted Paulos v. Best Securities Inc., 260 Minn.
283, 109 N.W.2d 576 (1961), where nonresident defendants sold stock to resident
plaintiffs, using long-distance telephone conversations and the mail to make the
sale. Defendant had no agents in Minnesota and had never carried on business
there. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that defendants' promoting of stock
sales and plaintiffs' acts of payment were sufficient as part performance in Min-
nesota. Thus, it appears that the Minnesota Supreme Court interprets its statute
as broadly as possible, leaving due process requirements as the only limitation
on state jurisdiction in personam over nonresidents. Compare Fourth North-
[Vol. XXVI
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substantial the performance under these part performance
statutes may be, it is necessary that the cause of action arise
out of the contract.50
Another broad requirement for jurisdiction found in the
statutes of some states is that the contract be "made" in the
state. Maryland, one of the states which pioneered the long-arm
statute, had this requirement until recently.5' Because the "place
of making" of a contract can be defined in several ways, the
courts have understandable difficulties. The leading case in this
area, Compania de Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 52 best ex-
emplifies the problem. An action for the breach of a contract for
the sale of three ships was brought against a Panamanian corpo-
ration whose only contact with the forum state was in connection
with the contract in issue. The defendant corporation conducted
negotiations in Maryland, and sent agents to inspect the ships
in that state. These activities, along with the fact that the con-
tract was technically completed in Maryland, sustained juris-
diction. 3 In later cases, where the contract was not "made" in
the state, jurisdiction was denied. Some cases have held that
either the making of the contract or activity in furtherance of
it by the nonresident physically present in the state of the forum
constituted the minimum contacts necessary to subject the non-
western Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. Hilson Indus. Inc., 264 Minn. 110, 117
N.W.2d 732 (1962).
50. See Dahlberg Co. v. American Sound Prod. Inc., 179 F. Supp. 928 (D.
Minn. 1959), where the foreign corporation entered into contracts which were
to be performed in Minnesota, but the cause of action did not arise from those
contracts. The court ruled that the plaintiff-resident could not bring an action
against the defendant without personal service in Minnesota. In dictum, the
court said that service on the Secretary of State would have been sufficient
had the cause of action arisen out of the contract. Cf. Williams v. Connolly, 22'
F. Supp. 539 (D. Minn. 1964), which held in a breach of warranty action that
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation could not be sustained where there was
no showing of privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant. However,
in dictum the court indicated that the privity requirement was on the way out
in Minnesota. Accord, preamble to LA. R.S. 13:3201 (Supp. 1964).
51. See MD. CODE ANN. art. 23, § 92(d) (1957). In June 1964 an amended
long-arm statute, very similar to Louisiana's, became effective in Maryland.
52. 205 Md. 237, 108 A.2d 372 (1954). This case has been the subject of
numerous law review notes and comments, particularly since it concerned an
isolated contract and was an early test of the "single-act" or "long-arm" statutes.
See, e. g., Developments in the Law - State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REV.
909, 926 (1960) ; Note, 42 MINN. L. REv. 909, 918 (1958).
53. The court did imply that the fact of completion in Maryland alone
would not have been enough to give Maryland jurisdiction. Cf. E Film Corp.
v. United Feature Syndicate, 172 F. Supp. 277 (N.D. Ill. 1958); Rosenberg v.
Andrew Weir Ins. Co., 154 F. Supp. 6 (D. Md. 1957) ; Chesapeake Supply &
Equip. Co. v. Manitowoc Eng'r Corp., 232 Md. 555, 194 A.2d 624 (1963) ; Pan
American Consulting Co. v. Corbu Industrial, S.A., 219 Md. 478, 150 A.2d 250
(1959).
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resident to personal jurisdiction.54 A 1965 case construing the
Maryland statute apparently expanded its application by holding
a nonresident corporation subject to suit under a contract which
the corporation did not join in making.5 5 However, the decision
appears sound, since the defendant corporation had come into
existence through a series of mergers after the contract had
been made by its predecessor.56 The court pointed out that the
Maryland statute subjects a foreign corporation to suit in Mary-
land "on any cause of action arising out of a contract made
within this State." There is no qualification that the contract
be made by the foreign corporation itself. Allowing such quali-
fication would mean that foreign corporations could easily avoid
the statute by having one corporation execute the contract in
the state and another foreign corporation outside the state un-
dertake or assume the performance of the contract.57
The Louisiana subsection on contracts reads "contracting to
supply services or things in this state." If this section is con-
strued literally, it would seem that a railroad corporation, having
no tracks or other property in the state, would not be amenable
to process even though it has an office in the state staffed with
agents for the purpose of soliciting business 58 - with no trans-
portation facilities, the corporation could supply no services. To
54. See, e.g., Kropp Forge Co. v. Jawitz, 37 Ill. App. 2d 475, 481, 186 N.E.2d
76, 79 (1962). The court said that "jurisdictional acts" by the nonresident indi-
vidual physically present in Illinois were essential for the submission to the
jurisdiction of the Illinois courts. This "jurisdictional act" must be determined
by the substance of the act, not the quantity of the business activity. The
defendant had sent a letter and a telegram to the plaintiff and had spent half
a day in Illinois. This was held to be sufficient to give Illinois jurisdiction
over the defendant.
55. Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Shaffer Stores Co., 240 F. Supp. 777 (D. Md.
1965).
56. The defendant corporation argued that activities of predecessor corpora-
tions should be disregarded. The court struck down this argument, reasoning
that to follow it would mean reading the old requirement of "doing business"
back into MD. COD ANN. art. 23, § 92(d) (1957), the long-arm statute. As
was stated in Compania, "the sole test of the propriety of subjecting a foreign
corporation to suit in Maryland is no longer whether or not the acts of the
foreign corporation within the state amount to 'doing business.' The explicit
wording of the statute points up the narrowness of the field in which such a
corporation is subject to suit in Maryland - that is, only to a suit by a resident
or a person having a regular place of business in Maryland on a cause of action
arising out of a contract made in Maryland." Id. at 783.
57. Id. at 780. By reading the statute literally, the court was able to subject
the defendant corporation, formed by mergers, to Maryland jurisdiction.
58. This was the situation in the "railroad cases," particularly Dolce v. Atchi-
son, T. & S.F. Ry., 23 F.R.D. 240 (E.D. Mich. 1959); Singleton v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 20 F.R.D. 15 (E.D. Mich. 1956) ; Hershel Radio Co. v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 334 Mich. 148, 54 N.W.2d 286 (1952) ; Smart v. Florida. E. Coast
Ry., 240 Mich. 542, 215 N.W. 390 (1927).
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the contrary, a television corporation which had no stations in the
state but which sent program material into the state via common
carrier for use by independent affiliate stations was held to be
supplying services in the state and amenable to the state's
process. 59 Concerning sales of goods within a state, a recent
decision listed several factors to be considered in determining
whether minimum contacts are established by the sale.6 Those
factors included the number and value of sales within the state,
the ratio of sales to total market for like products within the
state, quantity of value of defendant's production, percentage of
total output sold within the state, and the nature of the product
sold, particularly whether the thing sold is dangerous or not. 1
It is doubtful whether this subsection could be construed to
include contracts to purchase, since the wording is "contracting
to supply." However, in the context of the entire section, par-
ticularly the "transaction of any business" phrase, it seems evi-
dent that such contracts are within the area intended to be cov-
ered by the long-arm statute. The other jurisdictions with this
provision consistently have held nonresident purchasers subject
to jurisdiction in personam, in actions for breach of contract to
purchase. 2 Wisconsin's long-arm statute, probably the broadest
and most detailed in effect today, specifically provides for juris-
diction over actions arising out of services performed by plain-
tiff for a nonresident defendant, and goods purchased by defend-
ant from plaintiff.63 The wide coverage of the Wisconsin statute
was demonstrated in a case where the plaintiff and the defend-
ant contracted by mail, with defendant agreeing to purchase a
certain product from plaintiff over an extended period.4 De-
59. Hoffa v. National Broadcasting Co., 213 F. Supp. 895 (E.D. Mich. 1963).
Here NBC had only an office and agents selling ads in the state. The NBC pro-
grams were brought into the state for use by independent affiliates of NBC.
In dictum, the court said if NBC did not send its programs into the state, as
where the railroads did not run transportation services in the state, then no
jurisdiction. Cf. WSAZ, Inc. v. Lyons, 254 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1958).
60. Velandra v. Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292 (6th Cir.
1964).
61. In regard to these factors, see Donley v. Whirlpool Corp., 234 F. Supp.
869 (E.D. Mich. 1964) ; Chovan v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 217 F. Supp.
808 (E.D. Mich. 1963).
62. See, e.g., Baltimore Lumber Co. v. Marcus, 208 F. Supp. 852 (D. Md.
1962) ; Electronic Mfg. Corp. v. Trion, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. Ind. 1962);
Gavenda Bros v. Elkins Limestone Co., 145 W. Va. 732, 116 S.E.2d 910 (1960)
Flambeau Plastics Corp. v. King Bee Mfg. Co., 24 Wis. 2d 459, 120 N.W.2d
237 (1964).
63. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.05(5), a, b, c, d (Supp. 1965).
64. Flambeau Plastics Corp. v. King Bee Mfg. Co., 24 Wis. 2d 459, 129
N.W.2d 237 (1964).
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fendant breached the contract by refusing to make further or-
ders as agreed, after accepting and paying for some of the goods.
Defendant was held subject to the jurisdiction of Wisconsin."
Whether all the subsections of the Wisconsin statute are consti-
tutional has not yet been determined, but the statute has been
upheld, in general, by the lower federal courts.0 6 Louisiana's
statute, while not as detailed as Wisconsin's, could easily be con-
strued to cover most, if not all, situations provided for in the
Wisconsin statute.6 7
Louisiana has a specific provision that the cause of action
must arise from the acts or omissions listed in R.S. 13:3201.68
This precludes an assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident
when the cause of action is unrelated to the nonresident's con-
tacts with the state. However, some jurisdictions do allow as-
sertion of jurisdiction under such circumstances, at least where
the nonresident is a corporation. In a 1952 decision, Perkins v.
Benguet Consol. Mining Co.,6 9 the Supreme Court held that juris-
diction could be asserted over the defendant Philippine corpora-
tion by Ohio although the cause of action was unrelated to de-
fendant's activities in Ohio. The plaintiff was also a nonresi-
dent, but the Court held that Ohio did not violate due process by
asserting jurisdiction, particularly since Ohio was the only avail-
able forum with which the defendant had any connection. 7 The
Court held that the Constitution did not compel Ohio to take the
case, but it did not prohibit the assertion of jurisdiction.71 That
65. The court indicated that jurisdiction over the defendant could be predi-
cated on several subsections of the statute, including defendant's promise to pay
for plaintiff's services, and defendant's promise to pay for the goods to be manu-
factured by the plaintiff.
66. See Rosenberg v. Platt, 229 F. Supp. 8 (E.D. Wis. 1964) ; Sun-X Glass
Tinting of Mid-Wisconsin, Inc. v. Sun-X International, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 365
(W.D. Wis. 1964) ; Wisconsin Metal & Chemical Corp. v. DeZurik Corp., 222
F. Supp. 119 (E.D. Wis. 1963).
67. It seems that the Louisiana statute might be more practical in that it
permits the Louisiana courts to interpret the statute in light of decisions of the
federal courts in the area of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents. None of
the subsections of the Louisiana statutes is likely to be held unconstitutional,
and amendments will be unnecessary because of the great leeway the courts will
have in their interpretations of the statute.
68. LA. R.S. 13:3202 (Supp. 1964). The same result is clearly indicated by
the preamble to LA. R.S. 13:3201 (Supp. 1964).
69. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
70. This factor of the only available forum, and the case in general, is sue-
cinctly discussed in Developments in the Law - State-Court Jurisdiction, 73
HARv. L. Rav. 909, 932 (1960).
71. 342 U.S. 437, 446 (1952).
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Perkins should be distinguished on its facts has been suggested,72
but the decision has been followed many times without any limi-
tations. 78
INSURANCE CONTRACTS
Insurance comprises the greater part of the litigation con-
cerning nonresident contracts. The McGee case has for the most
part settled any controversy in this area. Because the business
involves contracts with multi-state effects, the states have tra-
ditionally put stringent regulations on insurance companies to
afford protection to local interests. Nearly all of the state in-
surance codes have provisions aimed at acquiring jurisdiction
over nonresident insurers who have minimum contacts with the
state.74
Louisiana's Insurance Code has sections which provide for
direct action against foreign insurers.7" The Code also provides
for jurisdiction over insurers which transact business in Lou-
isiana, or issue or deliver a policy here, without being author-
ized to do business in Louisiana. 76 Because of these provisions,
the Law Institute did not consider it essential to include insur-
ance contracts in Louisiana's long-arm statute.77
72. See, e.g., L. D. Reeder Contractors v. Higgins, Indus., 265 F.2d 768, 775
(9th Cir. 1959).
73. See, Scholnik v. National Airlines, Inc., 219 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1955)
Davis v. Asano Bussan Co., 212 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1954); Fisher Governor
Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 222, 347 P.2d 1 (1959) ; Dumas v. Chesapeake &
Ohio Ry., 253 N.C. 501, 117 S.E.2d 426 (1960) ; Lau v. Chicago & No. W. Ry.,
14 Wis. 2d 329, 111 N.W.2d 158 (1961).
74. These state codes also cover the "mail order" insurers who conduct ac-
tivities through the mail, and therefore have no physical contact with the state.
The first pertinent Supreme Court case concerning these insurers, with limited
approval given to the exercise of personal jurisdiction, was Traveler's Health
Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950). Seven years later McGee expressly
approved the exercise of personal jurisdiction in such situations. See also Pru-
dential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946), which pointed out that Con-
gress by passage of the McCarran Act, 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015
(1958), gave support to state regulation of the insurance business. Cf. Parmalee
v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 206 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1953), where the
Florida insurance statute was upheld as constitutional. For an extensive survey
on this area, see Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 416 (1955).
. 75. LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950) is Louisiana's Direct Action Statute, which was
held constitutional in Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66
(1954). See id. 22:982(2) and 22:985, which apply to foreign insurers.
76. Id. 22:1253A, as amended, La. Acts 1958, No. 125. This section impliedly
appoints the secretary of state as agent for service of process on any foreign
insurer not authorized to do business in Louisiana.
77. See Comment (c) under id. 13:3201. Several states included an insur-
ance subsection in their long-arm statutes, including Illinois, Maine, Michigan,
Montana, Washington, and Wisconsin.
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HAVING AN INTEREST IN, USING, OR POSSESSING A REAL RIGHT
OR IMMOVABLE PROPERTY IN THIS STATE
The property subsection of the Louisiana statute is similar
to that of several other states, 78 except for the words "real
right.179 The purpose of the inclusion was to obtain jurisdic-
tion in personam over nonresidents on causes of action connected
with mineral interests and with rights and obligations resulting
from contracts to reduce oil, gas, and other minerals to posses-
sionA0 These rights are asserted and defended in the same man-
ner as the ownership or possession of immovable property.81
Pennsylvania was the pioneer state in using the "ownership,
use, or possession of real estate" as a basis for in personam juris-
diction. 2 Adopted in 1937, the Pennsylvania statute applies to
tort actions only. The Illinois statute,83 adopted in 1955, applies
to any actions arising from real property in Illinois.8 4 Most of
the statutes apply only to real and not to personal property, but
a few, including those of Montana, Nevada, Washington, and
Wisconsin, include a provision for personal property.8 5
Obviously the presence of real property, owned, used, or pos-
sessed by nonresidents, should be sufficient contact to warrant
acquisition of jurisdiction in personam in causes of action re-
lated to the property, because the nonresidents enjoy the pro-
tections and benefits of the state where their property is located.
A case in point is Executive Properties Inc. v. Sherman,"6 where
78. See, e.g., the statutes of Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Montana,
New York, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin, as cited in McMahon,
Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresidents, 25 LA. L. REV. 28, n.10 (1964). For
a criticism of this type provision, see Stimson, Omnibus Statutes Designed To
Secure Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State Defendants, 48 A.B.A.J. 725, 727 (1962).
79. See LA. R.S. 13:3201(c) (Supp. 1964).
80. See Comment (e) under id. 13:3201.
81. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDRIE art. 3664 (1960). See also Kuchenig v.
California Co., 233 F. Supp. 389, 390 (E.D. La. 1964).
82. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 331 (1953). This statute's constitutionality
was upheld in Dubin v. City of Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (Phil. County
Ct. 1938) ; accord, Chong v. Faull, 88 Pa. D. & C. 557 (Phil. County Ct. 1954).
83. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 110, §17(1)c (1956).
84. See Porter v. Nahas, 35 Ill. App. 2d 360, 182 N.E.2d 915 (1962); af.
People v. Western Tire Auto Stores, Inc., 32 Ill. 2d 527, 207 N.E.2d 474 (1965).
The court in the latter case said that one who knowingly acquires, owns, or sells
property situated in a foreign state has no cause to complain about being re-
quired to defend claims in the foreign state which arise out of his own dealings
with it. See generally Note, Ownership, Possession, or Use of Property As a
Basis of In Personam Jurisdiction, 44 IOWA L. REV. 374 (1959).
85. These provisions could conceivably cause more problems than they solve.
For some examples, see Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of
Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 580 (1963).
86. 223 F. Supp. 1011 (D. Ariz. 1963).
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the nonresident defendants made a brokerage contract with an
Arizona corporation for the sale of Arizona land owned by the
defendants. Defendants repudiated the contract, and the federal
court held that there were sufficient contacts to render the de-
fendants subject to jurisdiction in personam.87
A recent Texas case, Able Finance Co. v. Whitaker,s s appears
to be the type of case envisioned by the drafters of Louisiana's
property subsection. There nonresident purchasers of an in-
terest in a mineral leasehold in Texas were held subject to the
jurisdiction in personam of Texas in an action for breach of
contract.
A problem which will surely arise in the future concerns the
nonresident purchaser of immovable property, or any real right,
who buys on credit. Whether this purchaser can be sued in Lou-
isiana by the holder of the mortgage is as yet undecided. The
very comprehensive Wisconsin statute has provisions which ap-
parently cover such a situation,8 9 but no other statute deals with
the problem in terms, and no case of the sort has yet arisen in
Wisconsin.9" It would seem that Louisiana's property subsection
could be interpreted to cover such a case.9 1
CONCLUSIONS
The advantages of the "long-arm" statutes are, for the most
part, clearly evident. A state is enabled, by means of the statute,
to protect its residents' interests. The old tests of "presence"
and "domicile," which often produced unfair results, are dis-
carded. The nonresident who enters a state to negotiate with
a resident or solicit his business is choosing to deal commer-
cially with a person in whose welfare the forum state has an
interest. That a nonresident who expects to enjoy or actually
enjoys profit should accept as a cost of doing business the ex-
pense of defending in the state is only right.92
87. The court stated that "modern concepts of the orderly administration of
justice require of the person who comes or extends himself into a forum's terri-
tory and breaches a duty or incurs an obligation therein, that he himself return
upon reasonable call and answer in personam." Id. at 1016.
88. 388 S.W.2d 437 (Texas 1965).
89. Wis. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 262.05(7) (Supp. 1965).
90. See Foster, Revision Notes, 30 Wis. STAT. ANN. p. 33 (Supp. 1965).
91. See note 67 supra.
92. See Developments in the Law - State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HIv. L.
REV. 909, 928 (1960). See also Ganz, "Doing Business" in Illinois as a Basis of
Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents- Due Process and Contacts, 1 ILL. CONTINUING
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. There are possible disadvantages resulting from these stat-
utes, and some are not readily discernible. There is the possi-
bility of several available forums,93 and this could work ad-
versely to the nonresident defendant, both in cost and incon-
venience. Because of the lack of uniformity among the states,
there is a problem of conflict of laws. The extension of state
judicial power could produce injustice by creating a situation of
unfairness and unreasonableness to the defendant.94 Another
somewhat hidden disadvantage is that these statutes may have
the effect of providing a convenient forum only to the plaintiff.95
Courts in interpreting the statutes may be tempted to set up
technical rules for determining certain important factors, as,
for example, where the contract was "made." The appropriate
consideration, in those cases where the court has some discre-
tion, should ultimately be the balance between the interest of
the state in the case and the hardship to the defendant.
Alex Williams Rankin
LEGAL ED. 75, 111-14 (1963), where the author discusses the theories of pro-
ponents and opponents of expanded jurisdiction and opines that the key in this
area is the effect that the transaction has on the forum state and its residents.
93. The nonresident defendant could be sued on a contract in the plaintiff's
state, the defendant's state, a state where defendant might be found, and, through
attachment, any state in which the defendant has property.
94. The courts often talk of applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens
or "balancing the conveniences." At times it appears that the doctrine or the
language is mentioned for effect, but is not always fairly applied. The discre-
tionary aspects of the doctrine tend to encourage courts to limit the forum non
conveniens principle, as was demonstrated in Hill v. Upper Mississippi Towing
Corp., 89 N.W.2d 654 (Minn. 1958). There the more convenient forum was
Tennessee, yet the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to allow the defendant to
submit the case to the Tennessee court. The complete discretion in the court
to apply the doctrine detracts considerably from its effectiveness. See Note, 37
IND. L.J. 333, 346 (1962).
95. See Note, 37 IND. L.J. 333 (1962), which is part of a student symposium
on "long-arm" jurisdiction, and has a good discussion on the adverse effects of
jurisdictional expansion. Id. at 340. There is also a section in the note devoted
to present safeguards against adverse effects. Id. at 345. Among the safeguards
discussed are the due process requirements, the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
the commerce clause (undue burden on interstate commerce), and the use of
detailed statutes. A possible solution to the problem, that of persuading the
courts to think in terms of one "best" jurisdiction out of the several available,
is presented. Id. at 348. Among the factors to determine a "best" jurisdiction
would be relative hardships of the parties, location of witnesses and proof, the
type of action involved, the problem of execution of judgments, defendant's expec-
tations of possible suits in foreign forums. Another solution suggested was a
wider use of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. This would make necessary
the use of special appearances to litigate the question of jurisdiction, which would
now be possible in all states. The threat of the use of forum non conveniens could
have the beneficial effect of causing lawyers to consider seriously their choices of
forums early in their preparation for suit.
